Rare Event Simulation for non-Markovian repairable Fault Trees by Budde, Carlos E. et al.
Rare event simulation for
non-Markovian repairable fault treesI
Carlos E. Budde1, Marco Biagi2, Raúl E. Monti1, Pedro R. D’Argenio3,4,5, and
Mariëlle Stoelinga1,6
1 Formal Methods and Tools, University of Twente, Enschede, the Netherlands
{c.e.budde,r.e.monti,m.i.a.stoelinga}@utwente.nl
2 Department of Information Engineering, University of Florence, Florence, Italy
marco.biagi@unifi.it
3 FAMAF, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Córdoba, Argentina
dargenio@famaf.unc.edu.ar
4 CONICET, Córdoba, Argentina
5 Department of Computer Science, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany
6 Department of Software Science, Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands
Abstract. Dynamic fault trees (dft) are widely adopted in industry
to assess the dependability of safety-critical equipment. Since many sys-
tems are too large to be studied numerically, dfts dependability is often
analysed using Monte Carlo simulation. A bottleneck here is that many
simulation samples are required in the case of rare events, e.g. in highly
reliable systems where components fail seldomly. Rare event simulation
(res) provides techniques to reduce the number of samples in the case of
rare events. We present a res technique based on importance splitting,
to study failures in highly reliable dfts. Whereas res usually requires
meta-information from an expert, our method is fully automatic: By
cleverly exploiting the fault tree structure we extract the so-called im-
portance function. We handle dfts with Markovian and non-Markovian
failure and repair distributions—for which no numerical methods exist—
and show the efficiency of our approach on several case studies.
1 Introduction
Reliability engineering is an important field that provides methods and tools
to assess and mitigate the risks related to complex systems. Fault tree analy-
sis (fta) is a prominent technique here. Its application encompasses a large
number of industrial domains that range from automotive and aerospace system
engineering, to energy and telecommunication systems and protocols.
Fault trees. A fault tree (ft) describes how component failures occur and
propagate through the system, eventually leading to system failures. Technically,
an ft is a directed acyclic graph whose leaves model component failures, and
I This work was partially funded by NWO, NS, and ProRail project 15474 (SE-
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whose other nodes (called gates) model failure propagation. Using fault trees
one can compute dependability metrics to quantify how a system fares w.r.t.
certain performance indicators. Two common metrics are system reliability—the
probability that there are no system failures during a given mission time—and
system availability—the average percentage of time that a system is operational.
Static fault trees (aka standard fts) contain a few basic gates, like AND and
OR gates. This makes them easy to design and analyse, but also limits their ex-
pressivity. Dynamic fault trees (dfts [21, 52]) are a common and widely applied
extension of standard fts, catering for more complex dependability patterns,
like spare management and causal dependencies. To model these patterns, dfts
come with additional gates, for instance SPARE, PAND, and FDEP.
Such gates make dfts more difficult to analyse. In static fts it only matters
whether or not a component has failed, so they can be analysed with Boolean
methods, such as binary decision diagrams [32]. Dynamic fault trees, on the other
hand, crucially depend on the failure order, so Boolean methods are insufficient.
Moreover and on top of these two classes, repairable fault trees (rft [7]) permit
components to be repaired after they have failed. This is crucial to model fault-
tolerant systems more realistically. Yet repairs make analyses even harder: it
does not suffice to know which components failed, or in which order, but also
if they are simultaneously failed. The general rule is that the more complex the
formalism, the more realistic the model, and the harder the analyses.
Fig. 2 is an rft with a top AND gate, a SPARE (Rcab), and three leaves.
Fault tree analysis. The reliability/availability of a fault tree can be computed
via numerical methods, such as probabilistic model checking. This involves ex-
haustive explorations of state-based models such as interactive Markov chains
[48]. Since the number of states (i.e. system configurations) is exponential in the
number of tree elements, analysing large trees remains a challenge today [32, 1].
Moreover, numerical methods are usually restricted to exponential failure rates
and combinations thereof, like Erlang and acyclic phase type distributions [48].
Alternatively, fault trees can be analysed using (standard) Monte Carlo sim-
ulation (smc [26, 48, 45], aka statistical model checking). Here, a large number
of simulated system runs (samples) is produced. Reliability and availability are
then statistically estimated from the resulting sample set. Such sampling does
not involve storing the full state space. Therefore, smc is much more memory
efficient than numerical techniques. Furhermore, smc is not restricted to expo-
nential probability distributions. However, a known bottleneck of smc are rare
events: when the event of interest has a low probability (which is typically the
case in highly reliable systems), millions of samples may be required to observe
it. Producing these samples can take a unacceptably long simulation time.
Rare event simulation. To alleviate this problem, the field of rare event sim-
ulation (res) provides techniques that reduce the number of samples [42]. The
two leading techniques are importance sampling and importance splitting.
Importance sampling tweaks the probabilities in a model, then computes the
metric of interest for the changed system, and finally adjusts the analysis results
to the original model [28, 39]. As a simple example consider a coin whose prob-
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ability of heads is p = 1/80. We can increase that probability to p′ = 1/8, but
count each occurrence of heads as 1/10 rather than as 1. This is typically denoted
change of measure. Thus, if we draw n = 1000 samples with the increased prob-
ability p′, and we see 67 heads coming up, we estimate the probability on heads
as 0.067 = 671000 · 110 . In the limit n → ∞, the expected number of heads that
come up is the same for the original and the tweaked model (after the adjust-
ment). However, sample outcomes have a lower variance in the tweaked model,
so statistical analyses converge faster: few samples yield accurate estimations.
Importance splitting, deployed in this paper, relies on rare events that arise
as a sequential combination of less rare intermediate events [34, 3]. We exploit
this fact by generating more (partial) samples on paths where such intermediate
events are observed. In the coin example, suppose we flip it eight times in a
row, and say we are interested in observing at least three heads. If heads comes
up at the first flip (H) then we are on a promising path. We can then clone
(split) the current path H, generating e.g. 7 copies of it, each copy evolving
independently from the second flip onwards. Say one of them observes three
heads—the cloned H plus two more. Then each observation of the rare event
(three heads) is counted as 1/7 rather than as 1, to account for the splitting that
spawned the clone. Now, if a clone observes a new head (HH), this is even more
promising than H, so the splitting mechanism can be repeated. If we make 5
copies of the HH clone, then observing the event of interest in any of these
copies counts as 135 =
1
7 · 15 . Alternatively, observing tails as second flip (HT ) is
less promising than heads. One could then decide not to split such path.
This example highlights a key ingredient of importance splitting: the impor-
tance function, that indicates for each state how promising it is w.r.t. the event
of interest. This function, together with other parameters such as thresholds [23],
are used to choose e.g. the number of clones spawned when visiting a state. An
importance function for our example could be the number of heads seen thus far.
Another one could be such number, multiplied by the number of coin flips yet to
come. The goal is to give higher importance to states from which observing the
rare event is more likely. The efficiency of an importance splitting implementa-
tion increases as the importance function better reflects such property.
Rare event simulation has been successfully applied in several domains [41,
54, 58, 5, 6, 55]. However, a key bottleneck is that it critically relies on expert
knowledge. In particular for importance splitting, finding a good importance
function is a well-known highly non-trivial task [42, 31].
Our contribution: rare event simulation for fault trees. This paper pre-
sents an importance splitting method to analyse rfts. In particular, we auto-
matically derive an importance function by exploiting the description of a system
as a fault tree. This is crucial, since the importance function is normally given
manually in an ad hoc fashion by a domain or res expert. We use a variety
of res algorithms based in our importance function, to estimate system unre-
liability and unavailability. Our approach can converge to precise estimations
in increasingly reliable systems. This method has four advantages over earlier
analysis methods for rfts—which we overview in the related work section 7—
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namely: (1) we are able to estimate both the system reliability and availability;
(2) we can handle arbitrary failure and repair distributions; (3) we can handle
rare events; and (4) we can do it in a fully automatic fashion.
Technically, we build local importance functions for the (automata-semantics
of the) nodes of the tree. We then aggregate these local functions into an im-
portance function for the full tree. Aggregation uses structural induction in the
layered description of the tree. Using our importance function, we implement
importance splitting methods to run res analyses. We implemented our theory
in a full-stack tool chain. With it, we computed confidence intervals for the un-
reliability and unavailability of several case studies. Our case studies are rfts
whose failure and repair times are governed by arbitrary continuous probability
density functions (pdfs). Each case study was analysed for a fixed runtime bud-
get and in increasingly resilient configurations. In all cases our approach could
estimate the narrowest intervals for the most resilient configurations.
Organization of the paper. We first introduce the formal concepts used for
our mathematical definitions in Secs. 2 and 3. Then, we detail our theory to
implement res for repairable dfts with arbitrary pdfs in Sec. 4. For that,
Sec. 4.1 introduces our (compositional) importance function, and Sec. 4.2 ex-
plains how to embed it into an automated framework for Importance Splitting
res. Next, Sec. 5 describes how we implement this theory in our tool chain.
In Sec. 6 we show an extensive experimental evaluation that corroborates our
expectations. We finally overview related work in Sec. 7, and conclude our con-
tributions in Sec. 8.
2 Fault tree analysis
A fault tree ‘4’ is a directed acyclic graph that models how component failures
propagate and eventually cause the full system to fail. We consider repairable
fault trees (RFTs), where failures and repairs are governed by arbitrary proba-
bility distributions.
BE1 BEn
(a)AND
BE1 BEn
(b)OR
k/n
BE1 BEn
(c)VOTk
BE1 BE2
(d)PAND
S1 SmP
(e)SPARE
T BE1 BEn
(f)FDEP
BE1 BEn (g) RBOX
Fig. 1: Fault tree gates and the repair box
Basic elements. The leaves of the tree, called basic events or basic elements
(BEs), model the failure of components. A BE b is equipped with a failure distri-
bution Fb that governs the probability for b to fail before time t, and a repair dis-
tribution Rb governing its repair time. Some BEs are used as spare components:
these (SBEs) replace a primary component when it fails. SBEs are equipped also
with a dormancy distribution Db, since spares fail less often when dormant, i.e.
not in use. Only if an SBE becomes active, its failure distribution is given by Fb.
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Scope Abbreviation Meaning
General
pdf Probability density function
ci Confidence interval
fta Fault Tree Analysis
ft Fault Tree
dft Dynamic Fault Tree
rft Repairable (Dynamic) Fault Tree
smc Standard Monte Carlo simulation
res Rare Event Simulation
iosa Input/Output Stochastic Automata
with Urgency [19]
Tree gates
(m inputs)
AND Conjunction: m-ary AND
OR Disjunction: m-ary OR
VOTk Voting: k out of m
PAND Priority AND
SPARE Spare: 1 primary BE, m-1 spare BEs
FDEP Functional dependency:
1 trigger, m-1 dependent BEs
Other
tree nodes
BE Basic element
SBE Spare basic element
RBOX Repair box
Case
studies
VOT Voting gates (synthetic)
DSPARE Double-spare gates (synthetic)
RWC Railway cabinets [25, 46]
HVC High voltage cab. (RWC subsys.)
RC Relay cab. (RWC subsys.)
FTPP Fault tolerant parallel processor [21]
HECS Hypothetical example computer
system [52]
Table 1: Glossary of acronyms and abbreviations
Gates. Non-leave nodes are called intermediate events and are labelled with
gates, describing how combinations of lower failures propagate to upper levels.
Fig. 1 shows their syntax. Their meaning is as follows: the AND, OR, and VOTk
gates fail if respectively all, one, or k of their m children fail (with 1 6 k 6 m).
The latter is called the voting or k out ofm gate. Note that VOT1 is equivalent to
an OR gate, and VOTm is equivalent to an AND. The priority-and gate (PAND)
is an AND gate that only fails if its children fail from left to right (or simultane-
ously). PANDs express failures that can only happen in a particular order, e.g.
a short circuit in a pump can only occur after a leakage. SPARE gates have one
primary child and one or more spare children: spares replace the primary when
it fails. The FDEP gate has an input trigger and several dependent events: all de-
pendent events become unavailable when the trigger fails. FDEPs can model for
instance networks elements that become unavailable if their connecting bus fails.
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Repair boxes. An RBOX determines which basic element is repaired next ac-
cording to a given policy. Thus all its inputs are BEs or SBEs. Repair events of
basic elements propagate along the tree analogously to fail events. Unlike gates,
an RBOX has no output since it does not propagate failures.
Top level event. A full-system failure occurs if the top event (i.e. the root
node) of the tree fails.
HV
cab P S
Rcab
Fig. 2:Tiny rft
Example. The tree in Fig. 2 models a railway-signal system,
which fails if its high voltage and relay cabinets fail [25, 46].
Thus, the top event is an AND gate with children HVcab (a BE)
and Rcab. The latter is a SPARE gate with primary P and
spare S. All BEs are managed by one RBOX with repair priority
HVcab > P > S.
Notation. The nodes of a tree4 are given by nodes(4) = {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}. We
let v, w range over nodes(4). A function type4 : nodes(4)→ {BE,SBE,AND,OR,
VOTk,PAND,SPARE,FDEP,RBOX} yields the type of each node in the tree. A
function chil4 : nodes(4)→ nodes(4)∗ returns the ordered list of children of a
node. If clear from context, we omit the superscript 4 from function names.
Semantics. The semantics of static fault trees, i.e. trees that only feature the
static gates AND, OR and VOTk, can be given as a Boolean function. For the
gates PAND,SPARE,FDEP the order of the failures matter, so a Boolean func-
tion does not suffice. Therefore, the semantics for (repairable) dynamic fault
trees is given in terms of stochastic transition models, such as Markov automata,
Petri nets, iosa, etc. Following [38] we give semantics to rft as Input/Out-
put Stochastic Automata (iosa), so that we can handle arbitrary probability
distributions. Each state in the iosa represents a system configuration, indicat-
ing which components are operational and which have failed. Transitions among
states describe how the configuration changes when failures or repairs occur.
More precisely, a state in the iosa is a tuple x = (x0, . . . ,xn−1) ∈ S ⊆ Nn,
where S is the state space and xv denotes the state of node v in 4. The possible
values for xv depend on the type of v. The output zv ∈ {0, 1} of node v indicates
whether it is operational (zv=0) or failed (zv=1) and is calculated as follows:
– BEs (white circles in Fig. 1) have a binary state: xv = 0 if BE v is operational
and xv = 1 if it is failed. The output of a BE is its state: zv = xv.
– SBEs (gray circles in Fig. 1e) have two additional states: xv = 2, 3 if a
dormant SBE v is resp. operational, failed. Here zv = xv mod 2.
– ANDs have a binary state. Since the AND gate v fails iff all children fail:
xv = minw∈chil(v) zw. An AND gate outputs its internal state: zv = xv.
– OR gates are analogous to AND gates, but fail iff any child fail, i.e. zv =
xv = maxw∈chil(v) zw for OR gate v.
– VOT gates also have a binary state: a VOTk gate fails iff 1 6 k 6 m children
fail, thus zv = xv = 1 if k 6
∑
w∈chil(v) zw, and zv = xv = 0 otherwise.
– PAND gates admit multiple states to represent the failure order of the chil-
dren. For PAND v with two children we let xv equal: 0 if both children are
operational; 1 if the left child failed, but the right one has not; 2 if the right
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child failed, but the left one has not; 3 if both children have failed, the right
one first; 4 if both children have failed, otherwise. The output of PAND gate
v is zv = 1 if xv = 4 and zv = 0 otherwise. PAND gates with more children
are handled by exploiting PAND(w1, w2, w3) = PAND(PAND(w1, w2), w3).
– SPARE gate v leftmost input is its primary BE. All other (spare) inputs are
SBEs. SBEs can be shared among SPARE gates. When the primary of v fails,
it is replaced with an available SBE. An SBE is unavailable if it is failed, or if
it is replacing the primary BE of another SPARE. The output of v is zv = 1
if its primary is failed and no spare is available. Else zv = 0.
– An FDEP gate has no output. All inputs are BEs and the leftmost is the
trigger. We consider non-destructive FDEPs [8]: if the trigger fails, the output
of all other BE is set to 1, without affecting the internal state. Since this can
be modelled by a suitable combination of OR gates [38], we omit the details.
For example, the rft from Fig. 2 starts with all operational elements, so the
initial state is x0 = (0, 0, 2, 0, 0). If then P fails, xP and zP are set to 1 (failed)
and S becomes xS = 0 (active and operational spare), so the state changes to
x1 = (0, 1, 0, 0, 0). The traces of the iosa are given by x0x1 · · ·xn ∈ S∗, where
a change from xj to xj+1 corresponds to transitions triggered in the iosa.
Nondeterminism. Dynamic fault trees may exhibit nondeterministic behaviour
as a consequence of underspecified failure behaviour [17, 33]. This can happen
e.g. when two SPAREs have a single shared SBE: if all elements are failed, and
the SBE is repaired first, the failure behaviour depends on which SPARE gets
the SBE. Monte Carlo simulation, however, requires fully stochastic models and
cannot cope with nondeterminism. To overcome this problem we deploy the the-
ory from [19, 38]. If a fault tree adheres to some mild syntactic conditions, then
its iosa semantics is weakly deterministic, meaning that all resolutions of the
nondeterministic choices lead to the same probability value. In particular, we
require that (1) each BE is connected to at most one SPARE gate, and (2) BEs
and SBEs connected to SPAREs are not connected to FDEPs. In addition to this,
some semantic decisions have been fixed, e.g. the semantics of PAND is fully
specified, and policies should be provided for RBOX and spare assignments.
Dependability metrics. An important use of fault trees is to compute relevant
dependability metrics. Let {Xt}t>0 be the stochastic process induced by 4 [15],
and let Xt,v be the random variable that represents the (distribution of the)
state of the top event of 4 at time t. We focus on two popular metrics:
• system reliability: is the continuity of correct service, i.e. the probability
of observing no top event failure before some mission time T > 0, viz.
RELT = Prob
(∀t∈[0,T ] . Xt,v = 0) ;
• system availability: the proportion of time that the system remains opera-
tional in the long-run, viz. AVA = limt→∞ Prob (Xt,v = 0).
System unreliability and unavailability are the reverse of these metrics. That is:
UNRELT = 1− RELT and UNAVA = 1−AVA.
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3 Stochastic simulation for Fault Trees
Input-Output Stochastic Automata (IOSA). iosa [19, 18] are an exten-
sion of GSMP [49] amenable to compositional modelling. An iosa is a state-
transition system where the residence time in a state is governed by a pdf.
iosas feature two ingredients that are crucial for our analysis: (1) residence
times can be governed by arbitrary probability distributions described by real-
valued clocks, and (2) discrete transitions are labelled by actions, and allow
automata to communicate with each other.
To record the passage of time and control the occurrence of events, iosa
use real-valued variables called clocks. Clocks are set to a positive random value
according to the (state-dependent) associated pdf. As time evolves, all clocks
count down from their respective values at the same rate. When the value of a
clock reaches zero it may trigger some action. Thus, to model BE e in a fault tree,
we associate a clock to Fe and another to Re. As a matter of fact, each node in
an ft is modelled as an iosa automaton. The propagation of fail/repair events
in the tree is done by (discrete, instantaneous) action synchronisation among
automata. Formally:
Definition 1 (iosa [19]). An Input/Output Stochastic Automaton with Ur-
gency is a tuple (S ,A, C,−→, s0, C0) where: (i) S is a denumerable set of states;
(ii) A is a denumerable set of labels partitioned into input labels Ai and output
labels Ao, where Au ⊆ A are urgent labels; (iii) C is a finite set of clocks s.t.
each x ∈ C has an associated continuous probability measure µx with support on
R>0; (iv) −→ ⊆ S × C × A × C × S is a transition function; (v) s0 ∈ S is the
initial state; and (vi) C0 ⊆ C are clocks initialized in s0.
Six constraints on −→ ensure that, in closed iosa obtained from the paral-
lel composition of all automata, nondeterminism is restricted to urgent actions.
These semantic constraints are translated into the syntactic conditions previ-
ously mentioned for fts. For insights see [19]; details on how to represent gates
and basic elements with iosa automata are in [38].
Modelling fault trees as iosa allows us to perform Monte Carlo simulation:
we generate traces, i.e. sequences of states x0,x1, . . . ,xm where each xj ,xj+1
is the projection on S2 of an element of −→ from Def. 1. Then, we estimate
dependability metrics via statistical analyses on a set of sampled traces.
Standard Monte Carlo simulation (SMC). Monte Carlo simulation takes
random samples from stochastic models to estimate a (dependability) metric of
interest. For instance, to estimate the unreliability of a tree 4 we sample N
independent traces from its iosa semantics. An unbiased statistical estimator
for p = UNRELT is the proportion of traces observing a top level event, that is,
pˆN = 1N
∑N
j=1X
j whereXj = 1 if the j-th trace exhibits a top level failure before
time T and Xj = 0 otherwise. The statistical error of pˆ is typically quantified
with two numbers δ and ε s.t. pˆ ∈ [p− ε, p+ ε] with probability δ. The interval
pˆ± ε is called a confidence interval (ci) with coefficient δ and precision 2ε.
Such procedures scale linearly with the number of tree nodes and cater for a
wide range of pdfs, even non-Markovian distributions. However, they encounter
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a bottleneck to estimate rare events: if p ≈ 0, very few traces observe Xj = 1.
Therefore, the variance of estimators like pˆ becomes huge, and cis become very
broad, easily degenerating to the trivial interval [0, 1]. Increasing the number of
traces alleviates this problem, but even standard ci settings—where ε is relative
to p—require sampling an unacceptable number of traces [42]. For instance,
choosing δ = 0.95 and ε = p10 (“95% confidence and 10% relative error”) requires
N > 384/p samples. Thus if UNRELT ≈ 10−8, one needs N > 38400000000
traces, making the simulation times unacceptably long. Rare event simulation
techniques solve this specific problem.
Rare Event Simulation (RES). res techniques [42] increase the amount
of traces that observe the rare event, e.g. a top level event in an rft. Two
prominent classes of res techniques are importance sampling, which adjusts
the pdf of failures and repairs, and importance splitting (isplit [36]), which
samples more (partial) traces from states that are closer to the rare event. We
focus on isplit due to its flexibility with respect to the probability distributions.
isplit can be efficiently deployed as long as the rare event γ can be de-
scribed as a nested sequence of less-rare events γ = γM ( γM−1 ( · · · ( γ0.
This decomposition allows isplit to study the conditional probabilities pk =
Prob(γk+1 | γk) separately, to then compute p = Prob(γ) =
∏M-1
k=0 Prob(γk+1 | γk).
Moreover, isplit requires all conditional probabilities pk to be much greater
than p, so that estimating each pk can be done efficiently with smc.
The key idea behind isplit is to define the events γk via a so called impor-
tance function I : S → N that assigns an importance to each state s ∈ S . The
higher the importance of a state, the closer it is to the rare event γM . Event γk
collects all states with importance at least `k, for certain sequence of threshold
levels 0 = `0 < `1 < · · · < `M . Formally: γk = {s ∈ S | I (s) > `k}. In other
words, a higher importance is assigned to states from which it is more likely
to observe the rare event. That is, for s, s′ ∈ S s.t. s ∈ γk and s′ ∈ γk′ , one
wants I (s) < I (s′) iff k < k′. Because then, in the nested sequence of events
γ0 ) · · · ) γM , each step γk−1 → γk makes it more likely to observe the rare
event. Therefore, choosing many thresholds (M  0) all very close to each other,
one ensures that Prob(γk | γk−1) 0 for all 0 < k 6M . Simply put, one makes
a lot of baby steps in the right direction.
To exploit the importance function I in the simulation procedure, isplit
samples more (partial) traces from states with higher importance. Two well-
known methods are deployed and compared in this paper: Fixed Effort and
restart. Fixed Effort (fe [23]) samples a predefined amount of traces in
each region Sk = γk \ γk+1 = {s ∈ S | `k+1 > I(s) > `k}. Thus, starting at γ0
it first estimates the proportion of traces that reach γ1, i.e. p0 = Prob(γ1 | γ0) =
Prob(S0). Next, from the states that reached γ1 new traces are generated to
estimate p1 = Prob(S1), and so on until pM . Fixed Effort thus requires that
(i) each trace has a clearly defined “end,” so that estimations of each pk finish
with probability 1, and (ii) all rare events reside in the uppermost region. In
particular, using fe for steady-state analysis (e.g. to estimate UNAVA) requires
regeneration theory [23], which is hard to apply to non-Markovian models.
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✘
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✔
(a) fe-5 for Prob(¬8U4)
✔
✗ ✘✗
✘
✗
✘
✗
(b) rst-es for UNRELT
Fig. 3: Importance Splitting algorithms Fixed Effort & restart
Example. Fig. 3a shows Fixed Effort estimating the probability to visit states
labelled 4 before others labelled 8. States 4 have importance >13, and thresh-
olds `1, `2 = 4, 10 partition the state space in regions {Si}2i=0 s.t. all 4 ∈ S2. The
effort is 5 simulations per region, for all regions: we call this algorithm fe-5. In
region S0, 2 simulations made it from the initial state to threshold `1, i.e. they
reached some state with importance 4 before visiting a state 8. In S1, starting
from these two states, 3 simulations reached `2. Finally, 2 out of 5 simulations
visited states 4 in S2. Thus, the estimated rare event probability of this run of
fe 5 is pˆ =∏2i=1 pˆi = 25 35 25 = 9.6× 10−2.
RESTART (rst- [57, 56]) is another res algorithm, which starts one trace
in γ0 and monitors the importance of the states visited. If the trace up-crosses
threshold `1, the first state visited in S1 is saved and the trace is cloned, aka
split—see Fig. 3b. This mechanism rewards traces that get closer to the rare
event. Each clone then evolves independently, and if one up-crosses threshold `2
the splitting mechanism is repeated. Instead, if a state with importance below
`1 is visited, the trace is truncated ( 7 in Fig. 3b). In general, each clone is
truncated as soon as it visits a state with importance lower than its level of
creation. This penalises traces that move away from the rare event. To avoid
truncating all traces, the one that spawned the clones in region Sk can go below
importance `k. To deploy an unbiased estimator for p, restart measures how
much split was required to visit a rare state [56]. In particular, restart does
not need the rare event to be defined as γM [53], and it was devised for steady-
state analysis [57] (e.g. to estimate UNAVA) although it can also been used for
transient studies as depicted in Fig. 3b [54].
4 Importance Splitting for FTA
The effectiveness of isplit crucially relies on the choice of the importance
function I as well as the threshold levels `k [36]. Traditionally, these are given
by domain and/or res experts, requiring a lot of domain knowledge. This section
presents a technique to obtain I and the `k automatically for an rft.
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4.1 Compositional importance functions for Fault Trees
By the core idea behind importance splitting, states that are more likely to lead
to the rare event should have a higher importance. To achieve this, the key lies
in defining an importance function I and thresholds `k that are sensitive to both
the state space S and the transition probabilities of the system. For us, S ⊆ Nn
are all possible states of a repairable fault tree (rft). Its top event fails when
certain nodes fail in certain order, and remain failed before certain repairs occur.
To exploit this for isplit, the structure of the tree must be embedded into I .
The strong dependence of the importance function I on the structure of the
tree is easy to see in the following example. Take the rft 4 from Fig. 2 and
let its current state x be s.t. P is failed and HVcab and S are operational. If the
next event is a repair of P, then the new state x′ (where all basic elements are
operational) is farther from a failure of the top event. Hence, a good importance
function should satisfy I (x) > I (x′). Oppositely, if the next event had been
a failure of S leading to state x′′, then one would want that I (x) < I (x′′).
The key observation is that these inequalities depend on the structure of 4 as
well as on the failures/repairs of basic elements. Because if instead of an AND,
the top event were a PAND gate (call this tree 4∗), the importance function
should behave in the exact opposite way. That is, in tree 4∗ one wants that
I (x) > I (x′′), since in x′′ the right child of the top PAND has failed before
the left child. When this happens, PAND gates go into an out-of-order internal
state, and cannot output a failure. So the same step from x to x′′ has completely
different meanings for4 and for4∗, as a result of their structure being different.
In view of the above, any attempt to define an importance function for an
arbitrary fault tree 4 must put its gate structure in the forefront. In Table 2
we introduce a compositional heuristic for this, which defines local importance
functions distinguished per node type. The importance function associated to
node v is Iv : Nn → N. We define the global importance function of the tree (I4
or simply I) as the local importance function of the top event node of 4.
Thus, Iv is defined in Table 2 via structural induction in the fault tree.
It is defined so that it assigns to a failed node v its highest importance value.
Functions with this property deploy the most efficient isplit implementations
[36], and some res algorithms (e.g. Fixed Effort) require this property [23].
In the following we explain our definition of Iv. If v is a failed BE or SBE,
then its importance is 1; else it is 0. This matches the output of the node, thus
Iv(x) = zv. Intuitively, this reflects how failures of basic elements are positively
correlated to top event failures. The importance of AND, OR, and VOTk gates
depends exclusively on their input. The importance of an AND is the sum of
the importance of their children scaled by a normalisation factor. This reflects
that AND gates fail when all their children fail, and each failure of a child brings
an AND closer to its own failure, hence increasing its importance. Instead, since
OR gates fail as soon as a single child fails, their importance is the maximum
importance among its children. The importance of a VOTk gate is the sum of
the k (out of m) children with highest importance value.
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Table 2: Compositional importance function for rfts.
type(v) Iv(x)
BE, SBE zv
AND lcmv ·
∑
w∈chil(v)
Iw(x)
maxIw
OR lcmv · max
w∈chil(v)
{ Iw(x)
maxIw
}
VOTk lcmv · max
W⊆chil(v),|W |=k
{∑
w∈W
Iw(x)
maxIw
}
SPARE lcmv ·max
(∑
w∈chil(v)
Iw(x)
maxIw
, zv ·m
)
PAND lcmv ·max
( Il(x)
maxI
l
+ ord Ir(x)maxIr
, zv · 2
)
where ord = 1 if xv ∈ {1, 4} and ord = −1 otherwise
with maxIv = maxx∈S Iv(x) and lcmv = lcm
{
maxIw
∣∣w ∈ chil(v)}
Omiting normalisation may yield an undesirable importance function. To
understand why, suppose a binary AND gate v with children l and r, and define
Inaivev (x) = Il(x) + Ir(x). Suppose that Il takes it highest value in maxIl = 2
while Ir in maxIr = 6 and assume that states x and x′ are s.t. Il(x) = 1,
Ir(x) = 0, Il(x′) = 0, Ir(x′) = 3. This means that in both states one child of v
is “good-as-new” and the other is “half-failed” and hence the system is equally
close to fail in both cases. Hence we expect Inaivev (x) = Inaivev (x′) when actually
Inaivev (x) = 1 6= 3 = Inaivev (x′). Instead, Iv operates with Il(x)maxI
l
and Ir(x)maxIr , which
can be interpreted as the “percentage of failure” of the children of v. To make
these numbers integers we scale them by lcmv, the least common multiple of their
max importance values. In our case lcmv = 6 and hence Iv(x) = Iv(x′) = 3.
Similar problems arise whit all gates, hence normalization is applied in general.
SPARE gates with m children (including its primary) behave similarly to
AND gates: every failed child brings the gate closer to failure, as reflected in the
left operand of the max in Table 2. However, SPAREs fail when their primaries
fail and no SBEs are available, e.g. possibly being used by another SPARE. This
means that the gate could fail in spite of some children being operational. To
account for this we exploit the gate output: multiplying zv by m we give the
gate its maximum value when it fails, even when this happens due to unavailable
but operational SBEs. For a PAND gate v we have to carefully look at the states.
If the left child l has failed, then the right child r contributes positively to the
failure of the PAND and hence the importance function of the node v. If instead
the right child has failed first, then the PAND gate will not fail and hence we let
it contribute negatively to the importance function of v. Thus, we multiply Ir(x)maxIr
(the normalized importance function of the right child) by −1 in the later case
(i.e. when state xv /∈ {1, 4}). Instead, the left child always contribute positively.
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Finally, the max operation is two-fold: on the one hand, zv · 2 ensures that the
importance value remains at its maximun while failing (PANDs remain failed
even after the left child is repaired); on the other, it ensures that the smallest
value posible is 0 while operational (since importance values can not be negative.)
4.2 Automatic importance splitting for FTA
Our compositional importance function is based on the distribution of opera-
tional/failed basic elements in the fault tree, and their failure order. This follows
the core idea of importance splitting: the more failed BEs/SBEs (in the right
order), the closer a tree is to its top event failure.
However, isplit is about running more simulations from state with higher
probability to lead to rare states. This is only partially reflected by whether basic
element b is failed. Probabilities lie also in the distributions Fb, Rb, Db. These
distributions govern the transitions among states x ∈ S , and can be exploited
for importance splitting. We do so using the two-phased approach of [12, 13],
which in a first (static) phase computes an importance function, and in a second
(dynamic) phase selects the thresholds from the resulting importance values.
In our current work, the first phase runs breadth-first search in the iosa
module of each tree node. This computes node-local importance functions, that
are aggregated into a tree-global I using our compositional function in Table 2.
The second phase involves running “pilot simulations” on the importance-
labelled states of the tree. Running simulations exercises the fail/repair distri-
butions of BEs/SBEs, imprinting this information in the thresholds `k. Several
algorithms can do such selection of thresholds. They operate sequentially, start-
ing from the initial state—a fully operational tree—which has importance i0 = 0.
For instance, Expected Success [11] runs N finite-life simulations. If K < N2 sim-
ulations reach the next smallest importance i1 > i0, then the first threshold will
be `1 = i1. Next, N simulations start from states with importance i1, to deter-
mine whether the next importance i2 should be chosen as threshold `2, and so on.
Expected Success also computes the effort per splitting region Sk = {x ∈ S |
`k+1 > I(x) > `k}. For Fixed Effort, “effort” is the base number of simulations
to run in region Sk. For restart, it is the number of clones spawned when
threshold `k+1 is up-crossed. In general, if K out of N pilot simulations make it
from `k−1 to `k, then the k-th effort is
⌈
N
K
⌉
. This is chosen so that, during res
estimations, one simulation makes it from threshold `k−1 to `k on average.
Thus, using the method from [12, 13] based on our importance function I4,
we compute (automatically) the thresholds and their effort for tree 4. This is all
the meta-information required to apply importance splitting res [23, 22, 12].
5 Tool chain implementation
We implemented the theory introduced in Sec. 4 in a full-stack tool chain. Its
input are plain text files in the Galileo textual format [51, 16, 50]: a widespread
syntax to describe fault trees [9, 20, 37]. Galileo was not designed for repairs,
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and has limited support for non-Markovian distributions: we thus extend it to
fit our needs. Fig. 4 shows the tool chain: a converter parses the rft defined
in extended Galileo; it generates an iosa model, property queries, and compo-
sitional importance function (using Table 2); from this input, the FIG tool can
implement res (importance splitting) algorithms, and use them to estimate
system unreliability and unavailability.
Importance function
Metrics     
 
Property query (metric)
IOSA semantic model
RFT model
(extended
Galileo)
RFT ⇾ IOSA
converter FIG
Fig. 4: Tool chain
5.1 Extensions to Galileo
Standard Galileo supports exponential, log-normal, and Weibull pdfs. We use
the keyword EXT_failPDF to define arbitrary failure distributions. In Code 1,
the SPARE gate (Gate2) has its primary (BE_C) and one spare (BE_D), whose
resp. fail pdfs are Rayleigh (σ = 0.06) and exponential (λ = 0.0011). We
also allow the dormancy pdf of an SBE to be independent of its fail pdf.
For this we add the EXT_dormPDF keyword to define an arbitrary dormancy
pdf. Thus we define the dormancy of BE_D as an Erlang(k = 3, λ = 9) in
Code 1. In the current implementation, a new time to failure is sampled (from
the corresponding pdf) as the SBE is activated when the primary BE fails. This
is a simplification since we work with potentially non-Markovian distributions;
more realistic implementations are proposed as future work in Sec. 8.
toplevel "Gate2 ";
"Gate2" wsp "BE_C" "BE_D";
"BE_C" EXT_failPDF=rayleigh (6.0E-2);
"BE_D" lambda =1.11E-3 EXT_dormPDF=erlang (3 ,9);
Code 1: SBEs and arbitrary pdfs in extended Galileo
Finally, we also extend Galileo with the keywords repairbox_priority and
EXT_repairPDF. These respectively define arbitrary repair policies for the RBOX
elements, and the repair pdfs of BEs and SBEs. All BEs in Code 2 are repairable,
with repair time uniformly distributed on the real intervals [8, 24] and [8, 12]. The
last line of the code defines the RBOX of the system, which handles one repair
at a time. Its repair policy determines which BE to choose when more than one
is failed at the same time. For instance, if all BEs fail and the RBOX “finishes
repairing” BE_G, it will next repair BE_E (before BE_F).
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toplevel "Gate3 ";
"Gate3" and "BE_E" "BE_F" "BE_G";
"BE_E" lambda =6.0E-5 EXT_repairPDF=uniform (8 ,24);
"BE_F" lambda =7.0E-5 EXT_repairPDF=uniform (8 ,24);
"BE_G" lambda =6.0E-5 EXT_repairPDF=uniform (8 ,12);
"RB1" repairbox_priority "BE_E" "BE_F" "BE_G";
Code 2: Repairs in extended Galileo
5.2 Converter: RFT → IOSA
We also implemented the iosa semantics for rft [38]. For this we developed a
Java textual converter whose input is an rft defined in extended Galileo. The
converter outputs the iosa semantics of the tree, and the composition function
for the corresponding local importance functions using Table 2.
Algorithm 1 Conversion from rft to iosa
1: procedure RFTtoIOSA(in, out[3])
2: rft ← parseRFT(in)
3: convertDynamicGates(rft)
4: cif ← templateImpFun(rft)
5: out[0] ← convertTree(rft)
6: out[0] ← convertRBOX(rft, out[0])
7: out[1] ← generateProperties(out[0])
8: out[2] ← generateImpFun(cif , out[0])
9: end procedure
The conversion procedure is show as Algorithm 1. The ast parsed from the
rft is first processed to convert the dynamic PAND and FDEP gates as de-
scribed in Sec. 4.1. From the resulting tree we implement (a template of) the
importance function following Table 2. Next, the iosa for each tree node is
computed following [38]. Once all automata names were thus defined, the RBOX
is built and added to the (now final) iosa semantics. Also the property queries
(system unreliability and unavailability) are then defined. Finally, the impor-
tance function template is filled with the iosa automata names, and returned
as a complete importance function.
Regarding the queries, unreliability and unavailability are encoded as variants
of pctl [27] and csl [2] that FIG can take as input. For instance, say we want
to estimate the unreliability of the rft defined in Code 2 at T = 15.5. If the
converter defined the variable count, internal to the iosa module corresponding
to the Gate3 AND, then generateProperties() produces a pctl query as in
Code 3.
properties
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P( U <=15.5 Gate3.count ==3)
endproperties
Code 3: Unreliability property query for Code 2
5.3 FIG: RES to estimate rare dependability metrics
The FIG tool was devised to study temporal logic queries of iosa models [10],
described either in their native syntax or in the janimodel exchange format [14].
Using res embedded in statistical model checking, FIG computes (arbitrary) cis
that estimate the degree to which a model complies to a property specification.
FIG was designed for automatic res, implementing the algorithms from [12,
13] to derive an importance function from the system model. It can select an
aggregation operator, to compose the local functions computed for the modules
of the system. This, however, depends on the property query, and does not lead
to high quality importance functions for fta, where the structure is in the tree
and not in the query—see [10] and our discussion in Sec. 4.1.
FIG can also be input a composition function, to aggregate the local im-
portance functions of the system modules. This is the feature used by our
rft → iosa converter, as detailed in Sec. 5.2 Thus, from the iosa model
and the importance function produced by our converter, FIG performs res to
compute cis around the dependability metrics queried.
6 Experimental evaluation
6.1 General setup
Using our tool chain, we have verified the efficiency of the theory introduced
in Sec. 4. We experimented on 26 repairable non-Markovian dfts using differ-
ent simulation algorithms: 1. Standard Monte Carlo (smc); 2. restart with
thresholds selected via the Sequential Monte Carlo algorithm [10, 11] for differ-
ent splitting values (rst-n for n = 2, 3, 5, 8, 11); 3. restart with thresholds
selected via the Expected Success algorithm [11] (rst-es); and 4. Fixed Effort
[23, 11] for different number of runs performed in each importance region (fe-n
for n = 8, 12, 16, 24, 32). res algorithms were implemented using the impor-
tance function defined in Table 2, by following the theory from [12, 13, 11] to
choose thresholds and splitting values automatically.
We ran our experiments in two types of nodes of a SLURM cluster running
64-bit Linux (Ubuntu, kernel 3.13.0-168): korenvliet nodes have CPUs Intel®
Xeon® E5-2630 v3 @ 2.40GHz, and 64GB of DDR4 @ 1600MHz RAM memory;
caserta has CPUs Intel® Xeon® E7-8890 v4 @ 2.20GHz, and 2TB of DDR4 @
1866MHz RAM memory.
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6.2 Division of experimental instances
We experimented on seven case studies. These were originally Markovian and
without repairs [21, 52, 25, 46]. To turn them into non-Markovian rfts we added
RBOX elements and modified its fail and repair pdfs as detailed in Sec. 6.3.
Moreover, to delineate the performance boost of our theory in the analysis of
rare dependability metrics, we tested each case study in increasingly resilient
configurations. For this, we parameterised them: a higher value of the param-
eter in a case study implies a more resilient system, i.e. smaller unavailability
or unreliability values. The values of the parameters are given in Table 3 and
described below. Figs. 8 and 9 show that, the rarer the metric, the more efficient
our res implementation becomes w.r.t. smc.
Table 3: General overview of experimental setting
.
Metric Casestudy
Difficulty Simulation
algorithmsP. Est. TO.
U
N
AV
A
IL
A
B
IL
IT
Y
VOT
2 8.47×10-4 5 m smc
rst-{2, 3, 5, 8, 11}3 1.94×10
-5 30 m
4 4.70×10-7 3 h
HECS
1 6.26×10-3 5 s
smc
rst-es
rst-{2, 5, 8, 11}
2 6.11×10-5 20 s
3 1.56×10-6 2 m
4 1.16×10-7 10 m
5 2.02×10-8 1 h
RC
3 3.73×10-5 30 s smc
rst-es
rst-{2, 5, 8, 11}
4 3.39×10-6 5 m
5 5.07×10-7 30 m
6 1.02×10-7 2 h
RWC
1 4.88×10-4 30 s
smc
rst-{2, 5, 8, 11}
2 3.15×10-5 5 m
3 3.03×10-6 30 m
4 4.55×10-7 2 h
U
N
R
E
LI
A
B
IL
IT
Y
DSPARE
3 7.03×10-4 5 m smc
rst-{2, 3, 5, 8, 11}
fe-{8, 16, 32}
4 6.08×10-5 30 m
5 7.31×10-6 3 h
HECS
2 1.98×10-3 20 s smc
rst-{2, 5, 8, 11}
fe-{8, 16, 32}
3 3.60×10-5 5 m
4 2.35×10-6 30 m
5 2.61×10-7 3 h
FTPP
(triad)
4 1.20×10-2 30 s smc
rst-{2, 5}
fe-{8, 12, 16, 24}
5 2.49×10-4 4 m
6 6.34×10-7 40 m
HVC
4 1.11×10-2 90 s smc
rst-{2, 5, 8, 11}
fe-8
5 4.61×10-4 5 m
6 3.44×10-5 30 m
7 4.17×10-6 2 h
RWC
2 7.03×10-4 5 m smc
rst-{2, 5, 8, 11}3 6.08×10
-5 30 m
4 7.31×10-6 2 h
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For each parametric case study we compare the simulation algorithms men-
tioned above. We estimate system unavailability and unreliability at time T =
103. For each combination of metric, fault tree, and algorithm—an instance—we
computed cis of 95% confidence level around the point estimate for the metric.
To do so, we ran simulations with FIG for predefined wall-clock runtimes (that
depend on the case and parameter as detailed in Table 3), and built 10 cis for
each instance. We then compared the average width of the cis per instance.
The algorithm with the most precise (narrowest) intervals was the most efficient
to compute that metric on that tree. In Sec. 6.4 we show that for the most re-
silient configurations of all case studies, res algorithms implemented from our
importance functions are more efficient (and as automatic) than smc.
An overview of the full experimental setting is given in Table 3. The pa-
rameterised configurations of all case studies are detailed in Difficulty. Its sub-
columns are: [ P. ] that gives the parameter value of each case study—see Sec. 6.3;
[ TO. ] for “Time-Out,” i.e. the simulation runtime, higher for the more resilient
configurations of a case study to let the algorithms sample some rare event;
and [ Est. ] that gives the point estimate averaged over all values†, ranging over
all simulation algorithms and the 10 (repeated and independent) computations
performed for each tree and metric.
Note that the Time-Out chosen for a (parameterised) case study may be
insufficient for certain algorithms to observe any rare event, e.g. for smc. If
that happens, the stochastic model checker FIG reports a “null estimate” [0, 0].
Moreover, the simulation of random events depend on the rng—and the seed—
used by FIG, so different runs may yield different cis. To account for these factors
when assessing the outcome of each instance, we computed each ci 10 times.
This gives us three dimensions to assess the performance of an algorithm in an
instance: (i ) how many times did it yield a not-null estimate, (ii ) what was the
average width of the resulting cis for that case study and parameter (considering
not-null estimates only), and (iii ) what was the variance of those widths.
For example, running simulations for 2 minutes, we estimated the unavail-
ability of the parameterised case study “HECS-3.” Using smc we computed 10
independent cis. The same was done for each of rst-2,5,8,11,es. Results are
shown as whisker-bar plots in Sec. 6.4. Each bar corresponds to the cis com-
puted for an instance, i.e. a specific algorithm on one case study with certain
parameter. The height of the bar is the mean ci width for the 10 iterations
of the algorithm (discarding null estimates). The whiskers on top of it are the
standard deviation of these widths, and a bold number at its base (e.g. 3 10 )
indicates how many iterations of algo yielded not-null estimates.
The cis themselves—whose width we compare in Sec. 6.4—for unavailability
of HECS-2, HECS-3, and HECS-4, are shown in Fig. 5. The three horizontal
lines are their corresp. unavailability values: 6.11×10-5, 1.56×10-6, and 1.16×10-7.
Here we tested algorithms smc, rst-es, and rst-{2, 5, 8, 11}. To explore res
diversity, yet keep the amount of experimentation manageable, in other cases we
tested different algorithms—see Table 3.
†We removed outliers using a modified Z-score with m = 2 [29].
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Fig. 5: cis for unavailability of HECS
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Fig. 6: cis for unreliability of HVC
The 10 cis computed per instance are separated in Fig. 5 by vertical gray
dashed lines. The cis are the coloured vertical error-bars. Some of them are the
trivial real interval [0, 1] and appear as vertical coloured lines; e.g. all iterations of
smc for HECS-4 except for the 4th, 8th, and 10th. Sometimes only one extreme
of the interval is not trivial, e.g. the 4th and 10th iterations of smc for HECS-
4 which respectively yielded [0, 6.31×10-7] and [0, 5.07×10-7]. When not even a
point estimate was computed for an iteration, the ci is missing completely from
the plot, e.g. the 8th iteration of smc for HECS-4.
Fig. 6 shows the cis computed in the same way for unreliability of the HVC
case study. In this case we experimented with the algorithms smc, fe-8, and
rst-{2, 5, 8, 11}. It can be seen that for HVC-6 (the downmost horizontal line
at 3.44×10-5) only the third iteration of smc yielded a complete ci, and it
is very wide. In contrast, algorithms like rst-2 and rst-8 always converged
to reasonable ci estimates in 30 m of simulation runtime for this system con-
figuration. This is the trend with all experiments: as expected, the more rare
the metric, the wider the cis computed in the time limit via smc, and at
some point it becomes infeasible to converge to non-trivial cis. In contrast, res
algorithms—implemented from our importance function—can still compute cis
in the most extreme situations experimented with our case studies. This is con-
veyed in Sec. 6.4 via whisker-bar plots, that show the average width of cis
achieved per instance.
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6.3 The case studies
We briefly describe the seven parametric case studies: VOT and DSPARE were
devised for this work, to check whether res is efficient on such tree structure and
probe different simulation runtime limits; FTPP and HECS were taken from the
literature on fta [21, 52]; and RC, HVC, and RWC concern industrial railroad
systems [26, 25, 46]. The structure of all these systems is presented in Fig. 7; the
fail, repair, and dormancy pdfs of their BEs and SBEs are given in Table 4.
VOT (Fig. 7a) The first case study is a binary AND gate whose children are
VOT gates, whose children are basic elements. All BEs are connected to a single
RBOX, which first repairs children of VOT-A and, if all are operational, then
repairs any failed child of VOT-B. VOT-A is a VOTkA gate with nA children, and
analogously for VOT-B, where nA = nB − 1, kA = nA − 3, and kB = nB − 2.
From the nA children of VOT-A, nB − 4 BEs are also children of VOT-B. VOT
is parameterised on nB = 8, 9, 10 resp. for VOT-{2, 3, 4}. Thus in VOT-2 in
Fig. 7a, VOT-A is a VOT4 with 7 children, and VOTB is a VOT6 with 8 children.
DSPARE (Fig. 7b) This is a ternary AND gate whose children are SPARE
gates, whose children are basic elements. SBEs are shared among all SPAREs:
each gate has a unique primary BE and n spare BEs. The parameterisation is
on n ∈ {3, 4, 5}: Fig. 7b shows DSPARE-3. All basic elements are connected
to a single RBOX, whose priority is to first repair failed SBEs and, if all are
operational, then repair failed BEs.
HECS (Fig. 7d) The Hypothetical Example Computer System is a classic
case study from fta literature [52]. We study the variant with two memory-unit
interfaces, that affect the memory banks via functional dependencies. Further-
more, we define one RBOX for each subsystem: Interface, Memory, Processors,
and Bus. HECS is parameterised on the number of parallel buses (BEs Bk) and
shared spare processors (SBEs PSb). For n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} HECS-n has n shared
spare processors and 2n parallel buses; Fig. 7d depicts HECS-2.
FTPP (Fig. 7f) The Fault Tolerant Parallel Processor is another classic ft. We
implemented the grouped cold-spare variant from [21], where all triads depend
on all network elements, and there is an independent SBE per triad. We study
an individual triad: the tree root is thus a VOT2 with 3 SPAREs as children—see
Fig. 7f. We defined independent repair boxes for the network and processing
elements; the RBOX in charge of processors prioritises the repair of primary
BEs. FTPP is parameterised on the number of (shared) SBEs of the triad. For
n ∈ {4, 5, 6} FTPP-n has n shared SBEs; Fig. 7f depicts FTPP-4.
RC (Fig. 7e) The Relay Cabinets subsystem is one of the components of the
railways cabinets example in Fig. 2. It is a VOTk gate with k + 2 children:
SPAREs with one (independent) SBE besides their primary BE. There is a single
RBOX for all basic elements, which prioritises repairs of primary BEs. RC is
parameterised in the number of SPAREs that need to fail to cause a top event:
k ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6}; Fig. 7e depicts RC-3.
HVC (Fig. 7c) High Voltage Cabinets is the other main component of the
railways cabinet example. This is a VOT2 gate with 4 SPARE children. Here
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Fig. 7: Case studies used for experimentation
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however the SBEs are shared among all SPAREs: HVC is parameterised in the
amount of these SBEs, n ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7}, with Fig. 7c depicting HVC-4. The single
RBOX is analogous to the one in RC.
RWC (Fig. 7g) The full Railways Cabinet case study combines RC and HVC
with a VOT. The SPAREs of RC are direct children of this gate, whereas the
high voltage cabinets are interfaced via an OR. The parameterisation of RWC,
m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, combines those of its subsystems. RWC-m uses RC-(m+1) and
HVC-(m+ 2); Fig. 7g depicts RWC-2.
Table 4: Basic elements of the case studies
Basic
element Fail time pdf Rep. pdf Dorm. pdf
VOT:
BE-A lnor(4.37, 0.33) uni(0.4, 0.95)
BE-B wei(4.5, 0.0125) uni(0.4, 0.95)
DSPARE:
BE exp(0.07) uni(1.0, 2.0)
SBE exp(0.07) uni(1.0, 2.0) exp(0.035)
HECS:
SW exp(4.5×10-12) uni(28.0, 56.0)
HW exp(1.0×10-10) uni(28.0, 56.0)
MIi exp(5.0×10-9) uni(21.0, 28.0)
Mj exp(6.0×10-8) uni(21.0, 28.0)
Bk exp(8.7×10-4) lnor(4.45, 0.24)
Pa exp(1.0×10-3) lnor(4.45, 0.24)
PSb exp(1.5×10-3) lnor(4.45, 0.24) dir(ℵ)
FTPP:
NEi lnor(6.5, 0.5) nor(150.0, 50.0)
Bj exp(2.8×10-2) nor(15.0, 3.0)
SBEk exp(2.8×10-2) nor(15.0, 3.0) dir(ℵ)
RC:
BEi exp(0.04) nor(2.0, 0.7)
SBEj exp(0.04) nor(2.0, 0.7) exp(0.5)
HVC:
BEi ray(1.999) uni(0.15, 0.45)
SBEj ray(1.999) uni(0.15, 0.45) erl(3.0, 0.25)
Abbrev: Distribution:
dir(x) Dirac(x)
exp(λ) exponential(λ)
erl(k, λ) Erlang(k, λ)
uni(a, b) uniform([a, b]R)
ray(σ) Rayleigh(σ)
wei(k, λ) Weibull(k, λ)
nor(µ, σ) normal(µ, σ)
lnor(µ, σ) log-normal(µ, σ)
6.4 Results of experimentation: comparing CI widths
Using smc and restart we computed UNAVA for VOT-{2, 3, 4}, HECS-
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, RC-{3, 4, 5, 6}, and RWC-{1, 2, 3, 4}. fe was not used since it re-
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Fig. 8: ci precision for system unavailability
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quires regeneration theory for steady-state analysis [23], which is not always
feasible with non-Markovian models. The mean widths of the cis achieved per
instance (ulting 95% confidence level) are shown in Fig. 8.
For example for VOT-2 (Fig. 8a), 10 independent computations with smc
ran in caserta for 5 min, and all converged to not-null cis ( 10 ). The mean width
of these cis was 1.40×10-4 and their standard deviation 7.96×10-6. For VOT-3, all
smc computations yielded not-null cis (after 30 min) with an average precision
of 9.62×10-6 and standard deviation 1.52×10-6. For VOT-4 all smc simulations
yielded null cis after 3 hours of simulation. Instead, rst-2 converged to 10, 10,
and 5 not-null cis resp. for VOT-{2,3,4}, with mean widths (and standard devi-
ation): 1.24×10-4 (1.19×10-5), 5.09×10-6 (1.48×10-6), and 1.79×10-7 (3.19×10-8).
Thus for the VOT case study, rst-2 was consistently more efficient than smc,
and the efficiency gap increased as UNAVA became rarer.
This trend repeats in all experiments: as expected, the rarer the metric, the
wider the cis computed in the time limit, until at some point it becomes very
hard to converge to not-null cis at all (specially for smc). For the least resilient
configuration of each case study, smc can be competitive or even more efficient
than some isplit variants. For instance for VOT-1 and HECS-1 in Figs. 8a
and 8b, all computations converged to not-null cis for all algorithms, but smc
exhibits less variable ci widths, viz. smaller whiskers. This is reasonable: truncat-
ing and splitting traces in restart adds (i ) simulation overhead that may not
pay off to estimate not-so-rare events, and on top of it (ii ) correlations of cloned
traces that share a common history, increasing the variability among indepen-
dent runs. On the other hand and as expected, smc looses this competitiveness
for all case studies as failures become rarer, here when UNAVA 6 1.0×10-5.
This holds nicely for the biggest case studies: HECS-5‡(a 42-nodes rft whose
iosa has 126-not-clock variables ≈ 2.89×1038 states, with 57 clocks of expo-
nential, uniform, and log-normal pdfs) and RWC-4 (42 nodes, 181 variables
≈ 6.93×1073 states, 62 clocks of exponential, Erlang, Rayleigh, uniform, and
normal pdfs).
We also estimated theUNREL1000 of DSPARE-{3,4,5}, RWC-{2,3,4}, FTPP-
{4,5,6}, HVC-{4,. . . ,7}, and HECS-{2,. . . ,5} using smc, restart, and fe.
For HVC (only) we ran 20 experiments per tree, 10 in each cluster node. Fig. 9
shows the results.
The overall trend shown for unreliability estimations is similar to the previous
unavailability cases. Here however it was possible to use Fixed Effort, since every
simulation has a clearly defined end at time T = 103. It is interesting thus to
compare the efficiency of restart vs. fe: we note for example that some
variants of fe performed considerably better than any other approach in the
most resilient configurations of FTPP and HECS. It is nevertheless difficult to
draw general conclusions from Figs. 9a to 9b, since some variants that performed
best in a case study—e.g. fe-16 in HECS—did worse in others—e.g. FTPP,
where the best algorithms were fe-8,12. Furthermore, fe-8, which is always
‡rst-8 for HECS-5 escapes this trend: analysing the execution logs it was found that
FIG crashed during the second computation.
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Fig. 9: ci precision for system unreliability
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better than smc when UNREL1000 < 10−3, did not perform very well in HVC,
where the algorithms that achieved the narrowest and most not-null cis were
rst-5,11. Such cases notwithstanding, fe is a solid competitor of restart in
our benchmark.
Another relevant point of study is the optimal effort e for rst-e or fe-e,
which shows no clear trend in our experiments. Here, e is a “global effort” used
by these algorithms, equal for all Sk regions. e also alters the way in which the
thresholds selection algorithm Sequential Monte Carlo (seq [13]) selects the `k.
The lack of guidelines to select a value for e that works well across different
systems was raised in [10]. This motivated the development of Expected Success
(es [11]), which selects efforts individually per Sk (or `k). Thus, in rst-es,
a trace up-crossing threshold `k is split according to the individual effort ek
selected by es. In the benchmark of [11], which consists mostly of queueing
systems, es was shown superior to seq. However, experimental outcomes on
dfts in this work are different: for UNAVA, rst-es yielded mildly good results
for HECS and RC; for the other case studies and for all UNREL1000 experiments,
rst-es always yielded null cis. It was found that the effort selected for most
thresholds `k was either too small—so splitting in ek was not enough for the
rst-es trace to reach `k+1—or too large—so there was a splitting/truncation
overhead. This point is further addressed in the conclusions.
Beyond comparisons among the specific algorithms, be these for res or for
selecting thresholds, it seems clear that our approach to fta via isplit de-
ploys the expected results. For each parameterised case study CSp, we could find
a value of the parameter p where the level of resilience is such, that smc is less
efficient than our automatically-constructed isplit framework. This is partic-
ularly significant for big dfts like HECS and RWC, whose complex structure
could be exploited by our importance function.
7 Related work
Most work on dft analysis assumes discrete [52, 4] or exponentially distributed
[17, 35] components failure. Furthermore, components repair is seldom studied
in conjunction with dynamic gates [7, 4, 48, 35, 37]. In this work we address
repairable dfts, whose failure and repair times can follow arbitrary pdfs.
More in detail, rfts were first formally introduced as stochastic Petri nets in
[7, 40]. Our work stands on [38], which reviews [40] in the context of stochastic
automata with arbitrary pdfs. In particular we also address non-Markovian
continuous distributions: in Sec. 6 we experimented with exponential, Erlang,
uniform, Rayleigh, Weibull, normal, and log-normal pdfs. Furthermore and for
the first time, we consider the application of [40, 38] to study rare events.
Much effort in res has been dedicated to study highly reliable systems, de-
ploying either importance splitting or sampling. Typically, importance sampling
can be used when the system takes a particular shape. For instance, a common
assumption is that all failure (and repair) times are exponentially distributed
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with parameters λi, for some λ ∈ R and i ∈ N>0. In these cases, a favourable
change of measure can be computed analytically [24, 28, 39, 41, 58, 47].
In contrast, when the fail/repair times follow less-structured distributions,
importance splitting is more easily applicable. As long as a full system failure
can be broken down into several smaller components failures, an importance
splitting method can be devised. Of course, its efficiency relies heavily on the
choice of importance function. This choice is typically done ad hoc for the model
under study [53, 36, 55]. In that sense [30, 31, 12, 13] are among the first to
attempt a heuristic derivation of all parameters required to implement splitting.
This is based on formal specifications of the model and property query (the
dependability metric). Here we extended [12, 13, 10], using the structure of the
fault tree to define composition operands. With these operands we aggregate
the automatically-computed local importance functions of the tree nodes. This
aggregation results in an importance function for the whole model.
8 Conclusions
We have presented a theory to deploy automatic importance splitting (isplit)
for fault tree analysis of repairable dynamic fault trees (rfts). This Rare Event
Simulation approach supports arbitrary probability distributions of components
failure and repair. The core of our theory is an importance function I4 defined
structurally on the tree. From such function we implemented isplit algorithms,
and used them to estimate the unreliability and unavailability of highly-resilient
rfts. Departing from classical approaches, that define importance functions ad
hoc using expert knowledge, our theory computes all metadata required for res
from the model and metric specifications. Nonetheless, we have shown that for
a fixed simulation time budget and in the most resilient rfts, diverse isplit
algorithms can be automatically implemented from I4, and always converge to
narrower confidence intervals than standard Monte Carlo simulation.
There are several paths open for future development. First and foremost, we
are looking into new ways to define the importance function, e.g. to cover more
general categories of fts such as fault maintenance trees [44]. It would also be
interesting to look into possible correlations among specific res algorithms and
tree structures, that yield the most efficient estimations for a particular metric.
Moreover, we have defined I4 based on the tree structure alone. It would be
interesting to further include stochastic information in this phase, and not only
afterwards during the thresholds-selection phase.
Regarding thresholds, the relatively bad performance of the Expected Success
algorithm shows a spot for improvement. In general, we believe that enhancing
its statistical properties should alleviate the behaviour mentioned in Sec. 6.4.
Moreover, techniques to increase trace independence during splitting (e.g. re-
sampling) could further improve the performance of the isplit algorithms. Fi-
nally, we are investigating enhancements in iosa and our tool chain, to exploit
the ratio between fail and dormancy pdfs of SBEs in warm SPARE gates.
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